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Background 
 
Wheat prices have trended lower in the U.S. since the early to mid-1990s.  Table 1 shows crop year 
average cash prices, production in the U.S. and the world, exports from the U.S., and ending stocks in the 
U.S. from 1994/95 through 2001/2002.  Production in the U.S. has declined in the presence of downward 
trending prices, but world production has trended higher.  U.S. exports worked higher until 1998/1999 
and then dropped below the billion bushel level in the 2001/2002 crop year (June 1, 2001 to May 31, 
2002).  With 40 to 60 percent of U.S. production moving into exports, the U.S. wheat producer is tied 
directly to what is happening at the world level for wheat, which is an important global commodity.  The 
risks of volatile and low prices are as high as they have ever been.   
 
Table 1.  U.S. and World Wheat Production with U.S. Prices, Exports, and Ending Stocks 
Production   







  (million bu.)  (million MT)  $/bu  million bu.  million bu. 
1994/95 2,321  525  3.45 1,188  507 
1995/96 2,183  537  4.55 1,241  376 
1996/97 2,285  583  4.30 1,001  444 
1997/98 2,481  609  3.38 1,040  722 
1998/99 2,547  588  2.65 1,042  946 
1999/00 2,299  586  2.98 1,090  950 
2000/01 2,232  584  2.62 1,061  876 
2001/02 1,958  580  2.78  960  758 
Source:  USDA. World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates, http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/ 
 
In any price risk management plan, the place to start is to establish a probable price range for the 
upcoming year based on fundamental supply-demand considerations.  A model of the relationships 
between prices and ending stocks captures the essence of the fundamental relationships.  This procedure 
is developed in detail by Kenyon and Lucas in the Rural Economic Analysis Program (REAP) research 
report Wheat Pricing Guide (R039) and is at www.reap.vt.edu, publications, research reports. 
 
Based on the data in Table 1, clearly a negative bias exists to U.S. wheat prices relative to U.S. ending 
stocks in recent years.  The reason is the expanding world-level production.  The growing competition for 
export markets is important to the U.S. producer.  The Wheat Pricing Guide takes account of the changing 
relationships and will be useful to a producer in establishing perspective.  To be good at price risk 
management, the producer must be willing to forward price.  Wheat is a global commodity; the producer, 
at any one point in time, is a price taker and subject to the supply-demand-generated world price.  A price 
taker cannot control price, but the producer can choose when to price and, in the process, have an 
influence on the profitability of his or her business.    
 
Wheat can be forward priced in at least three basic ways: 
 
1.  Cash forward contracts.  A buyer extends an offer to a grower at a specific cash price for delivery 
at a future harvest or post-harvest date.  The cash offer is tied to futures prices by the cash-futures 
basis.  Delivery must be made by the producer, so there is little flexibility to change or adjust.  
When a cash forward delivery contract is signed, the buyer will immediately sell wheat futures 
(usually July) to cover the risk that prices will go down.  The cash contract offer will, therefore, 
tend to go up or down with increases and decreases in the underlying futures contract.    
   2
2.  Hedging by selling futures.  The producer goes directly to the futures market, sells futures, and 
thereby establishes a specific price subject to basis performance.   
 
FP = FUTURES + BASIS 
 
Where  FP  =  the forward pricing opportunity in the futures, 
  FUTURES  =  the trading level of the appropriate wheat futures contract (usually July), 
and 
  BASIS  =  the cash-futures relationship that localizes the Chicago Board of Trade or 
Kansas City Board of Trade discovered price for wheat. 
 
Once the basis estimate is determined from local cash and national-level futures prices from past years, it 
is essentially set for the new production year unless unusual supply or demand circumstances suggest an 
adjustment is needed.  The FP, therefore, tends to go up and down directly with the discovered prices in 
the futures market.  The producer is exposed to basis risk because the final net price depends on the 
actual, not expected, level of the cash-futures basis when the cash product is sold and the short (selling 
futures is “going short”) futures positions are closed out by buying back the contracts.  If the wheat 
market declines, the futures are bought back at lower prices, and the funds to cover cash price declines are 
accumulating in the futures account.  But if the market goes up, the producer can receive “margin calls” 
and be asked to send funds to the broker.  The margin calls will continue so long as the market moves 
higher.  The final net price is then the cash price reduced by losses in the futures account.  Whether price 
trend is up or down, net price is always the cash price plus the results of the “round turn” in futures from 
selling early and buying back at a later date.  (Details on basis calculations and use and on margin 
accounting are available in Agricultural Futures and Options: Principles and Strategies by Purcell and 
Koontz, Prentice Hall, 1999, ISBN# 0-13-779943-8.) 
 
3.  Setting a price floor by buying a put option.  The price floor or PFL is set by 
 
    PFL  =  STRIKE PRICE + BASIS – PUT PREMIUM 
 
Where    PFL  =  the floor price being offered the producer, and 
  STRIKE PRICE  =  a specific futures price in terms of 10-cent increments. 
  PUT PREMIUM  =  cost of the right to be short in futures at a specific strike price, and 
  FUTURES and BASIS are as defined above. 
 
Options on wheat trade for “strike prices” in 10-cent increments ($2.60, $2.70, $2.80, etc.).   Producers 
can choose higher or lower price floors by buying put options for higher or lower strike prices.  If the 
market goes down, the put option can be sold at a price, its premium, above its initial cost.  The decline in 
cash prices is covered by the increasing premium value of the put option.  Basis risk is still present 
because the put option will move, as it approaches maturity, to an option premium approaching the full 
observed decline in the cash market and thereby provide the exact floor price expected only when closing 
basis is the same as the allowed for basis early in the year.  Option premiums will be higher in volatile 
markets and with more time left before expiration.  Options can be a relatively costly way of acquiring 
price insurance.  But if the market goes up, the producer will benefit as soon as the increase matches the 
option premium.  There can never be margin calls when producers buy put options.   
 
Timing of Action Is the Key 
 
Regardless of which of the three price risk management tools is selected, the key to a successful price 
risk management program is knowing when to take action—and having the discipline to take that action.    3
The issue of timing is difficult.  Often, the correct thing to do is to take action while prices are still 
trending higher.  But many producers have trouble with this decision.  What if the market goes up after 
the cash contract is signed or the futures contracts are sold?  What is an opportunity cost (the chance to 
sell at higher levels) is often seen as a loss and a mistake by producers, and they are reluctant to take 
action the next time the same scenario presents itself.   
 
A number of approaches to technical analysis of bar charts for the wheat market can help with this timing 
decision and the related willingness to take action.  Learning to “read” the bar chart can help, and basic 
tools can be applied to the chart.  This section introduces some widely used chart-based technical tools.  
The intent is to demonstrate “chart reading” with selected chart patterns and, at the same time, start to 
build a reason for producers who either have trouble reading the chart or lack the discipline to take action 
on chart-based signals to look for a more objective approach.  But before we look at the charts, exploring 




Most users of the futures in commodity markets and most advisory services and risk management 
services gravitate toward a selective hedger status.   A simplistic approach that sells futures and holds the 
short hedges until the cash product is sold or an approach that accepts a cash forward contract offer from 
a buyer may be a good place to start.  But the unpredictable nature of weather in commodities like hard 
red winter wheat usually means producers are second guessing the simplistic strategy within the first few 
years of their price risk management program.  A price that barely covers costs of production may look 
attractive early in the growing season when the fundamental supply-demand outlook is bearish, but 
weather can then prompt price rallies that push price far above the early-year price.  If forward pricing is 
done with a cash contract, producers suffer an opportunity cost in the form of a missed chance to get a 
much higher price, and they feel as if they have made a mistake.   If the forward pricing is done with 
futures contracts, margin calls that continue as the market moves up add to the cost of the forward pricing 
program.  Sustained margin calls can strain producers’ access to capital.  When margin calls are being 
received, it is in fact true that the short hedge in the futures will ensure the specific price at which hedges 
are placed subject to basis performance.  The only costs that are not just opportunity costs are the interest 
charges on the added margin monies.  But sustained margin calls bring difficult problems for producers.  
The worst possible scenario is one in which producers can no longer answer margin calls as the market 
moves up and the short hedges are removed.  If the weather then improves and the market declines 
dramatically, a worst case scenario develops for producers who, having removed the hedges due to 
margin money concerns, have no protection as prices plummet.   
 
Put option strategies are some producers’ answer to the margin call dilemma and to concerns about 
missing the benefits of unexpected higher prices.  But option premiums can be quite high in volatile 
markets with several months before harvest.  Buying out-of-money puts to keep premium costs down 
lowers the price floor that producers are attempting to establish.  Having worked through one or more of 
the futures or options strategies and started to look at price risk management in a broader context, some 
producers move toward a selective hedging approach.  The idea is to have short hedges in place when the 
price trend is down and to buy back those short hedges when the price trend turns up.  The producer will 
avoid the opportunity costs and margin problems associated with short hedges in upward trending 
markets, and he or she will be in a position to benefit from the rising cash prices by selecting a position 
that deliberately has the farm firm exposed to the risks in the cash market.      
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Timing the Placing and Lifting of Selective Hedges 
 
The timing of sell and buy-back decisions in selective hedging strategies is the key to success, and timing 
is not easy.  If the timing of the actions is effective, producers can have the best of all worlds: protection 
from short hedges when the price trend is down, and exposure to and benefit from rising cash prices when 
the price trend is up.  As suggested earlier, one approach to this “timing” is to read the bar charts for 
widely recognized buy and sell signals.  In this section, I will demonstrate several chart patterns that are 
widely used.   
 
Before starting to watch for chart-based signals, however, a producer needs to establish a reasonable price 
range for the year based on fundamental supply-demand considerations.  The reader is again encouraged 
to examine and use the simple model of the relationship between cash prices and ending stocks for wheat 
in the pricing guide by Kenyon and Lucas on the REAP website, www.reap.vt.edu.  It does no good for 
the wheat producer to muster courage and discipline to do some forward pricing and then set price 
objectives that the fundamentals suggest are highly unlikely to be offered during the year.   
 
Trend Line Chart Signals 
 
One widely used approach to the timing of decisions by a selective hedger is to read the chart for 
appropriate sell signals to place short hedges and then continue to use the chart to look for chart-based 
buy signals to remove the short hedges.  The July 1998 Kansas City wheat futures chart provides an 
illustration (Figure 1).  An uptrend line is drawn across two price lows, and a trend line hooking the 
harvest-period low on this contract in early July 1997 and the dip to the 385
1 area in early October 
provides an illustration of an uptrend line that chart watchers would like to see.  The two lows are at least 
10 trading days apart, and the trend line is not very steep in slope.  When the market closes below that 
trend line in late October, a sell signal indicates that hedges should be placed.  Sell-stop orders 1-2 cents 
below the trend line will place the short hedges, or market orders can be placed near the close when it is 
clear the close will be below the trend line.  Short hedges would have been placed in the 390-395 price 
range:  these would be attractive prices, probably in the upper one-third of any fundament supply-demand 
price range that might have been established for the year.   
 
Once those short hedges are placed, the chart later allows the sketching of a downtrend line hooking the 
mid-October high and the early-December high.  A buy signal would have been generated by a close 
above that trend line during January in the 365 price area.  As the market tries to rally and show 
something of a more sustained price appreciation during February and March, the selective hedger would 
now be off the short hedges and looking to benefit from an upward trending cash market. 
 
 
                                                      
1 Wheat futures are traded in cents per bushel.  When dealing directly with a chart, I will use cents per bushel such 
as the 385 here.  When discussing wheat prices in general, I will often shift to dollars per bushel, such as $3.85, 
because dollars per bushel is the way producers think about prices.     5
  
Subsequent sell signals are generated on the chart, however.  Continuing to use the trend line idea by 
hooking the early-January and mid-to-late February lows allows a trend line that would generate a sell 
signal with a close below that line in the 350-355 area.  Those short hedges should have been in place 
until late June or early July.  A downtrend line hooking the mid-March and the early-May highs would 
have been taken out by a close above it in late June, which is appropriate timing for removing short 
hedges as the producer moves through harvest.   
 
A moment’s reflection indicates that while a chart line idea has some objectivity associated with it in 
terms of taking action on closes that violate the trend lines, it still has a judgmental component.  In the 
1998 contract, for example, some might argue that connecting the early-July low with the mid-September 
low would have generated a sell signal earlier.  The earlier sell still would have put the producer in good 
shape, but using these “steeper” trend lines can be problematic.   
 
Useful chart-related information is also associated with the new life-of-contract lows that occurred in 
early January in the 345-350 area.  Those lows and the rally after they were established generate what 
chart watchers call a support plane.  Using the trend line approach, the short hedges would  be bought 
back in mid-to-late January.  A bit later, even without using the little trend line connecting the early-
January and mid-February lows, an important sell signal is generated in late March when the market 
shows two consecutive closes in new life-of-contract low price ground.  The two consecutive closes 
below the old life-of-contract low is a sell signal on a commodity such as hard red winter wheat that is 
recognized in every corner of the world.  After that sell signal, the market moved substantially lower 
toward harvest.   
 
As this commentary suggests, additional aids can be brought to the situation by the chart reader.  The life-
of-contract low is an extremely important support plane that should always be watched.  Anytime two 
consecutive closes are below the old life-of-contract price low, the odds are extremely high that the 





































Figure 1.  Trend Line Sell and Buy Signals on July 1998 KC Wheat   6
market will go substantially lower.  The sell signal should be used to replace short hedges if this happens 
before a new uptrend line can be drawn.  Like all the chart reading that is needed for a selective hedger to 
be effective, however, some judgment is always involved.  The need for judgment bothers some 
producers who would like to see more objective sell and buy signals for a selective hedging program. 
 
Selling Rallies to Contract Highs 
 
  That same 1998 July wheat chart can be used to demonstrate the opportunities associated with 
selling a price rally to an old life-of-contract high (Figure 2).  In April 1997, when there was very little 
trade in this contract as evidenced by the lack of daily trading ranges, a life-of-contract high up toward 
410 was established.  Given that a $4.00 plus price is likely to be toward the top end of most analysts’ 
fundamentally based probable price range for the year, producers have an excellent opportunity if they 
will sell a rally back up toward that contract high.  Generally, it is a good idea to place a sell order 2 to 3 
cents a bushel below the old high to increase the chances of having short hedges placed.  One can expect 
a horde of sell orders sitting at or just below the resistance plane across the old life-of-contract high.  The 
rally in late August stopped about 5 cents short of the contract high, and then the market dipped.  It took 
another run up toward the old high in mid-October but never quite traded up to that level, falling 1.5 cents 
short.  The turn 1.5 cents below the old high is concrete evidence that selective hedgers, speculators, 
processors, and exporters holding long hedges in wheat are all willing to sell a rally toward the contract 
high.  Selling such a rally is an opportunity to place short hedges that is likely to put producers in at prices 
well above what typically occurs using sell signals with uptrend lines on the chart.  Selling the rally 
requires producers to sell into a market that is trading higher as it moves up and approaches the important 
resistance plane across the life-of-contract high. Not all producers are able to muster the discipline to sell 
into a rising market.  Certainly in this instance, it would have been an attractive way to proceed because it 
placed short hedges above 400 and very nearly at the high for the year. 
 
Once that resistance plane approach is used to place short hedges, a support plane approach can be used to 
remove the short hedges.  The idea is to buy back short hedges by placing buy orders 2-3 cents above the 
life-of-contract low, an important support plane for prices.  An important support plane is at the life-of-
contract lows on this chart—across the July low in the 350 area.  The short hedges should be bought back 
at 351 or so in January, some 1.5 cents above the earlier July low at 349.50.  When two consecutive 
closes below that plane occurred in January, the short hedges should have been replaced, but 
characteristics of these markets bother some producers.  In this particular instance, given that it was early 
in the producing year, there was still a lot of uncertainty with regard to crop size and yield.  The market 
rallied after generating the sell signal by the dips down through the old contract low support plane.  Some 
producers would have taken those hedges off using the downtrend line discussed, and others would have 
suggested that the rally is just a correction of the break down from the 405 level in October down toward 
345 in January.  But again, judgment comes into play.  If the short hedges were lifted on the rally in 
January and February, they should go back on when the market comes down through the new contract 
low around 345 in late March and early April.  As was the case with the trend lines, judgment is involved 
with resistance and support planes, and again, some producers start to look for a more objective approach.   
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Placing Short Hedges on Market Corrections 
 
Chart analysts expect the markets to move and often, in response to some stimulus or catalyst, move too far 
and then correct.  A “correction” is a useful mechanism and a useful tendency on the charts for producers 
who miss pricing opportunities at still higher levels and are then in a mode of waiting for a correction to 
place short hedges.  The July 1992 Kansas City wheat futures is used to demonstrate (Figure 3).   
 
In early February, the market surges to a new life-of-contract high at 430.50.  It is rather clear that some 
trend line possibilities on this chart could have generated sell signals sooner (back in August and 
September).  But assume the producer did not want to sell this early in the growing season and watched 
the market dip down toward the 346 level in April.  When the market started to rally from that 346 level, 
chart watchers watch for possible corrections of 38 percent, 50 percent, and 62 percent.  All of those 
correction levels are shown on the chart.  The 38 percent correction, which is the smallest correction that 
is typically observed, is around 378.  On two occasions in early May and again in early June, the market 
rallied to this level and then proceeded to turn lower.  After the first rally of some 38 percent that 
occurred in May, the next rally, of course, bumped into the new resistance plane across that early-May 
high.  An intermediate resistance plane is not as important as the plane across the life-of-contract high, 
but an intermediate plane can be an important pricing objective on later price rallies.  Here, the life-of-
contract high was never challenged again after that 430 was recorded in early February.  So, there was 
more than one reason to sell this market on the second rally in early June if still had concerns that prices 
would be forced lower through harvest.  The market did, in fact, move down 50 cents a bushel after 
February.   


































Figure 2.  Contract Highs and Lows, July 1998 KC Wheat   8
 
But again, some judgment is involved in all of these chart patterns.  One reasonable question that a 
potential user would ask is, “In any particular set of circumstances, which one of the three corrections do I 
expect?”  The answer is that it depends on how bearish the situation is.  I typically look for a 50 percent 
correction as the most likely one, but if the market has moved down some 80 cents per bushel as 
fundamentals start to deteriorate, as they did in 1992 from February through April, the fundamental 
outlook in wheat prices is, arguably, very bearish and all the market will be able to muster is a 38 percent 
correction.  What frustrates potential users, of course, is selling a 38 percent correction to place short 
hedges and then seeing the market move up to complete a 50 percent and then a 62 percent correction 
before turning lower--and answering the margin calls that are involved.  Once again, some producers 
want a more objective approach to a selective hedging program.   
 
Moving Averages in a Selective Hedging Program 
 
A more objective approach to timing in a selective hedging program is to use moving averages.  A 9-day 
moving average is the last 9 closing prices added and divided by 9.  An 18-day moving average uses the 
last 18 closing prices.  When prices are turning higher after a sustained price decline, the 9-day moving 
average will turn and will move up through the 18-day.  When prices turn down from a high level, the 9-
day moving average will move down through the 18-day.  Buy and sell signals are generated when the 
shorter moving average crosses the longer moving average.  Various versions of moving averages are 
widely used in stock and commodity markets.  Here, the interest is in using two moving averages to 
dictate the timing of selling (placing short hedges) and buying (lifting short hedges) in a selective hedging 
program.   
 
Table 2 demonstrates the 9-day and 18-day moving averages on July 2000 Kansas City wheat.  Starting 
with October 8, 1999, for the purposes of demonstration, the closing prices are shown.  As soon as there 

























Figure 3.  Market Correction Possibilities on the July 1992 KC Wheat   9
are nine closing prices (October 20), a 9-day moving average can be calculated.  The 9 closing prices are 
added and divided by 9.  On November 2, with 18 closing prices, the 18-day moving average can be 
calculated.  The electronic data services typically calculate moving averages for the user.  At 
www.britefutures.com, one can choose any current wheat contract, specify the length of moving averages 
at the bottom of the page, and click on “redraw.”  The moving averages will then show on the chart.   
 
Table 2.  9-Day and 18-Day Moving Averages from October 8, 1999 to 
November 5, 1999, July 2000 Kansas City Wheat 
   Moving  Averages 
Date Closing  Price  9-Day  18-Day 
  (cents per bushel) 
October     8, 1999  308.00     
October   11  308.50     
12 312.00     
13 309.00     
14 309.00     
15 311.00     
October   18  314.50     
19 318.00     
20 311.50  311.278   
21 312.50  311.778   
22 314.00  312.389   
October   25  316.50  312.889   
26 311.75  313.194   
27 311.50  314.472   
28 311.75  313.556   
29 310.75  313.139   
November 1, 1999  308.00  312.028   
2 311.00  311.972  311.625 
3 314.75  312.222  312.000 
4 317.00  312.556  312.472 
5 314.50  312.333  312.611 
 
Examination of Table 2 indicates that on November 4, the 9-day moving average drops below the 18-day, 
generating a sell signal. The user can establish short positions before the close on November 4 if the close 
will clearly generate a sell signal, or short positions can be established the next morning.  Most of my 
research indicates it will not make a significant difference in effectiveness whether the closing price on 
November 4 or the opening price on November 5 is used.  At some later date, a buy signal to buy back the 
short hedges may be generated when the 9-day moves above the 18-day.   
 
The moving averages can be calculated as soon as enough closing prices are available.  Figure 4 shows 
the 9 and 18-day moving averages on the July 2000 contract.  A sell signal is generated early on April 12 
in 1999 at a closing price of 339.00.  These short hedges are bought back on May 19 at a closing price of 
325.00.  Another sell signal is generated May 21 at 326.50.  These short hedges are bought back on June 
7 at 334.00.  The next sell signal is June 23 at 327.00.  Those short hedges are bought back at 318.00 on 
July 27.  The selling and buying based on the moving average signals can be started as soon as the 
contract starts trading, started after harvest of the prior year, or some other rule can be used.  My 
preference would be to start with the first sell signal after the prior harvest, but once the system is started, 
it can be monitored and used until the upcoming harvest.   
   10
 
Table 3 shows the date short hedges are placed, the dates they are removed, and the net gain or loss before 
commissions for the entire year.  As I implied above, most producers would not start using the system as 
early as May 1999, and short hedges would be bought back by most producers before the last day of trade 
on July 20.  For the entire dataset, 12 round turn (sell and later buy back) trades were generated with a net 
gain of 5.50 cents after deducting 1.0 cents per bushel per round turn (sell and later buy back) in 
commissions.   
 
The results for the 2000 contract show the strengths and weaknesses of a moving average system, and I 
selected this contract because it demonstrates both.  A sustained move down in price from September 
through December requires that the producer be protected in the event the market continues to trend 
lower.  The 9/18 system generated a sell signal on September 20 at 325.25, but then made a “mistake” in 
late October by prematurely signaling a “bottom” in the market.  Actually, the market corrected to the 
upside for several days and then continued lower.  Later in the year, when the market turned volatile and 
choppy, several losing round turns were generated and the system lost most of its earlier gains.  Upon 
examination of the outcomes using the 9/18 moving average system, the default system in many 
electronic services, an immediate question comes to mind: 
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Figure 4.  Demonstration of the 9-Day and 18-Day Moving Averages on the July 2002 KC   11
Table 3.  Effect of 9-Day and 18-Day Moving Averages on Gains and 







Net Trade (¢/bu) 
04/12/99 Sell  (S)  339.00   
05/19/99 Buy  (B)  325.00  14.00 
05/21/99 S  326.50   
06/07/99  B 334.00 -7.50 
06/23/99 S  329.00   
07/27/99 B  318.00  11.00 
08/23/99 S  335.50   
09/10/99  B 337.50 -2.00 
09/20/99 S  325.50   
10/27/99 B  311.50  14.00 
11/05/99 S  314.50   
11/12/99 B  306.00  8.50 
11/16/99 S  310.50   
12/28/99 B  294.75  15.75 
02/03/00 S  303.25   
02/14/00 B  320.50  -17.25 
02/28/00 S  296.75   
03/16/00  B 306.00 -9.25 
03/27/00 S  289.50   
05/05/00  B 296.50 -7.00 
06/06/00 S  297.75   
06/21/00 B  310.50  -12.75 
07/07/00 S  287.00   
07/20/00 Closeout  276.50  10.50 
Net before commissions:  17.50 cents 
Net after commissions:  5.50 cents 
 
The Research Results 
 
Will some other set of moving averages handle these Kansas City wheat markets better and generate a 
more profitable selective hedging system?  This question above prompted a major research effort to 
search for the optimal set of moving averages for Kansas City July wheat.  In this section, each of the July 
Kansas City wheat contracts from 1990 through 2000 is analyzed.  I look at the optimal set of moving 
averages, the one that has the biggest after-commission profits from the 1990s, and the 9-day and 18-day 
“default” set as a comparison.  The optimal set was the 10-day and 61-day moving averages with a 2-cent 
penetration requirement.  One of the weaknesses in moving average systems is to issue premature sell 
signals before a top in the market is in place, or premature buy signals before a bottom is in place.  Such 
weaknesses were apparent in the 2000 July wheat contract: when the market turned choppy and volatile 
late, several losing round turns were generated.  Using a penetration rule helps eliminate some of these 
frequent and often losing trades.  Every combination of moving averages from 2 up to 70 was tested with 
penetration requirements of 0, 0.25, 0.50, 1.0, and 2.0 cents for each moving average combination.  The 
optimal set, the 10/61 and 2-cent penetration, requires that the 10-day moving average be below the 61-
day by 2.0 cents or more to confirm a sell signal, be above  the 61-day by 2.0 cents or more to confirm a 
buy signal.  This section reviews the results by date of transactions, number of trades, and before and after 
commission profits.   12
The objective of moving averages as a guide to a selective hedging system is to have protection in place 
when there is a sustained and potentially ruinous down turn in prices and to be off short hedges, exposed 
to the cash market, when there is a sustained up turn in prices.  The moving averages used in the research 
effort and reviewed for each year 1990 through 2000 are reviewed with this objective in mind.  How 
effective was the protection during years in which prices went down, and how effective were the systems 
in keeping producers off short hedges during years when the price trend was to higher prices?  I will come 
back to these questions later after each year has been reviewed and look at effectiveness in the years when 
price trends were up and down and also review the years in which the moving averages systems were not 
effective in meeting the stated objective.    
 
The early 1990s contracts did not start trading until 12 months or sometimes less before contract maturity.  
It takes 61 closing prices on the July futures contract to calculate the needed 61-day moving average, and 
this calculation was not possible in some of the early years until well after harvest of the prior year.  To be 
consistent across all years, I started with November 1 which allowed a 61-day moving average calculation 
on most contracts and established short hedges at the close of the July futures on November 1 if the 10-
day was below the 61-day by 2 cents or more, or at the first sell signal after November 1 if the 10-day was 
above the 61-day on November 1.  The same approach was used for the 9-day and 18-day moving 
averages.  If the 9-day was already below the 18-day, a short position was established at the close on 
November 1.   
 
In the yearly reviews that follow, the term “short” is used to denote the first placement of short hedges 
when a short position was being called for by the moving averages and the penetration rule for the 10/61 
system on November 1.  If the first indication in the table reads “sell,” the moving average system was 
long (10 above the 61 by more than 2.0 cents on November 1) and the first hedges were placed on a sell 
signal after November 1.   
 
At the close of each year, the short hedges are either bought back by a buy signal from the moving 
averages or, if no buy signal has been generated, the short hedges are closed out at the closing price on 
July 10.  The term “closeout” will appear in the tables when the short hedges are still in place on July 10.   
 
In the reviews, the words sell and buy are used for the first transactions, and then “s” and “b” are used to 
stand for sell and buy respectively.  The terminology will be clear after one or two of the annual reviews 
are studied.  On all of the charts, the shorter moving average is shown in red.  The use of color to make 
the crossing action as clear as possible suggests the manuscript should be printed in color if possible.  
 
In reviewing the results, remember, I will stick to cents per bushel in identifying the levels at which 
hedges are placed and bought back and in referring to a specific price level on the charts.  Wheat is traded 
in cents per bushel, but most producers think in terms of dollars per bushel, so I will sometimes move into 
use of dollars per bushel when discussing price levels in general and when there is no specific reference to 
one of the futures charts. 
 
   13
Table 4.  Transaction Dates, Prices, and Net for Each Round Turn Trade in a 





Closing Price  
(¢/bu)  
Net Trade  
(¢/bu) 
9/18 System with No Penetration Rule 
11/01/89 Short  352.00   
11/09/89 Buy  (B)  360.25 -8.25 
12/08/89 Sell  (S)  365.50   
12/21/89 B  370.00  -4.50 
01/05/90 S  370.50   
01/10/90 B  369.00  1.50 
01/17/90 S  366.75   
03/23/90 B  348.25  18.50 
04/04/90 S  351.50   
04/12/90 B  346.50  5.00 
04/26/90 S  344.50   
05/02/90 B  354.25  -9.75 
05/18/90 S  344.75   
07/10/90 Closeout  303.75 41.00 
Overall gain:   43.50 ¢ 
Gain less commissions:   36.50 ¢ 
10/61 and 2-Cent Penetration System 
11/01/89 Short  352.00   
11/14/89 B  360.00  -8.00 
01/26/90 S  358.25   
05/08/90 B  356.00  2.25 
05/24/90 S  332.00   
07/10/90 Closeout  303.75 28.25 
Overall gain:         22.50 ¢ 




Both moving average systems were in a sell position with the shorter moving average below the longer 
one on November 1, thus the use of “short” as described on page 12.  The 9/18 (9-day in red) moving 
average’s improved performance came primarily because of the quicker entry to short positions on May 
18 at a closing price of 344.75 (Figure 5).  That position was in place until the closeout on July 10 at 
303.75 and the 9/18 generated 36.50 cents after commissions.   
 
The 10/61 (10-day in red) with the 2-cent penetration requirement was slower to enter the market short 
during May.  A confirmed signal was not generated until May 24 at a closing price of 332 (Figure 6).  The 
intent behind the 10/61 and 2-cent penetration requirement is to eliminate frequent and losing trades.  
This year was not characterized by a great deal of sideways, choppy action, and the slowness with which 
the 10/61 system signaled short hedges hurt performance.  The 10/61 recorded after commission gains of 


















Figure 5.  July 1990 KC Wheat, 9/18 Moving Averages 













Figure 6.  July 1990 KC Wheat, 10/61 Moving Averages   15
Table 5.  Transaction Dates, Prices, and Net for Each Round Turn Trade in a Short-









9/18 System with No Penetration Rule 
11/01/90 Short 283.75   
11/08/90 Buy  (B) 292.75 -9.00 
11/19/90 Sell  (S)  278.00   
12/12/90 B 276.50  1.50 
12/24/90 S 276.00   
01/28/91 B 273.00  3.00 
02/15/91 S 275.75   
02/25/91 B 274.75  1.00 
03/25/91 S 292.25   
04/01/91 B 300.50  -8.25 
04/18/91 S 290.00   
05/13/91 B 296.00  -6.00 
05/31/91 S 287.00   
07/10/91 Closeout 266.00 21.00 
    Overall  gain:   3.25  ¢ 
    Gain  less  commissions:  -4.25  ¢ 
10/61 and 2-Cent Penetration System 
11/01/90 Short 283.75   
02/26/91 B 277.00  6.75 
06/07/91 S 290.75   
07/10/91 Closeout 266.00 24.75 
    Overall  gain:   31.50  ¢ 




The charts (Figures 7 and 8) show a sometimes choppy market that has the potential to generate losing 
trades for moving average systems.  Losing trades by the 9/18 demonstrate the problems in choppy 
markets with not sustained trends.  The initial short position established in accordance with the rule on 
November 1 lost 9 cents.  Two additional losing trades occurred for the 9/18 during April and May.   
 
The 10/61 was also given a short position on November 1.  This particular contract started trading so late 
in the year that a 61-day moving average really could not be calculated until early December, but the 
same short position attributed to the 9/18 was also attributed to the 10/61 at 283.75 cents.  The 10/61 
system generated a confirmed buy signal to remove those short hedges on February 26 at a closing price 
of 277.00.  The penetration requirement before another sell signal would be taken was not met until June 
7 at 290.75.  The system was closed out on July 10 at a closing price of 266.00.  The 10/61 system was far 
superior in this year to the 9/18, generating after-commissions additional revenue of 29.5 cents per bushel 
as compared to a loss of 4.25 cents per bushel with the 9/18.     16
 
 













Figure 8.  July 1991 KC Wheat, 10/61 Moving Averages 













Figure 7.  July 1991 KC Wheat, 9/18 Moving Averages   17
Table 6.  Transaction Dates, Prices, and Net for Each Round Turn Trade in a 









9/18 System with No Penetration Rule 
11/04/91 Sell  (S)  335.00   
11/27/91 Buy  (B)  332.50  1.50 
02/24/92 S  393.00   
04/27/92 B  362.00 31.00 
05/20/92 S  347.50   
06/04/92 B  368.00  -20.50 
06/19/92 S  356.75   
07/10/92 Closeout  332.00  24.75 
    Overall  gain:   37.75  ¢ 
    Gain  less  commissions:  33.75  ¢ 
10/61 and 2-Cent Penetration System 
03/23/92 S  378.00   
06/09/92 B  379.00 -1.00 
06/23/92 S  352.25   
07/10/92 Closeout  332.00  30.25 
    Overall  gain:   29.25  ¢ 




This year brought a relatively strong uptrend in price, up into the $4.30 per bushel area in February.  
Producers would want the moving average systems to avoid short hedges as long as the trend is strongly 
higher to eliminate margin call problems and to allow producers to benefit from the increasing cash 
prices.  The 9/18 generated a sell signal shortly after the start date of November 1 on November 4 and 
generated a buy signal at a small profit later in the month (Figure 9).  The big move in this market to the 
downside came during February, March, and April.  The 9/18 generated a sell signal on February 24 and a 
buy signal on April 27 for a gross gain of 31.00 cents.  During the choppy action of late May and June, 
the 9/18 moving average system had difficulties and lost 20.50 cents on the trade that was generated from 
May 20 to June 4.  The system was short when the closeout occurred on July 10.   
 
The 10/61, as should be anticipated, did not trade as often and was slower to generate confirmed sell 
signals.  The first confirmed signal came on March 23 at a closing price of 378.00 (Figure 10).  That trade 
was closed at a small loss on June 9.  The system then replaced short hedges at 352.25 on June 23 and 
generated an overall gain of 29.25 cents at the closeout on July 10.  Overall gains after commissions were 
27.25 cents for the 10/61 system, below the 33.75 generated by the 9/18 but quite effective performance.  
There would be 27.25 cents added to the producers selling price in late June or early July, and the futures 
price equivalent on July 10 would have been $3.32 plus the 27.25 cents or $3.59.  For the 9/18, the futures 
price equivalent was even better at nearly $3.66.   
   18
 
 






















Figure 10.  July 1992 KC Wheat, 10/61 Moving Averages 






















Figure 9.  July 1992 KC Wheat, 9/18 Moving Averages   19
Table 7.  Transaction Dates, Prices, and Net for Each Round Turn Trade in 










9/18 System with No Penetration Rule 
11/02/92 Short  321.00   
11/10/92 Buy  (B)  321.00  0.00 
12/09/92 Sell  (S)  320.00   
01/11/93 B  318.50  1.50 
02/02/93 S  317.25   
04/05/93 B  308.75  8.50 
04/26/93 S  299.25   
05/20/93 B  299.00  0.25 
06/02/93 S  289.50   
07/01/93 B  290.75  -1.25 
    Overall  gain:   9.25  ¢ 
    Gain  less  commissions:  4.25  ¢ 
10/61 and 2-Cent Penetration System 
11/02/92 Short  321.00   
11/19/92 B  326.25  -5.25 
12/22/92 S  313.00   
01/19/92 B  330.75  -17.75 
02/08/93 S  314.50   
07/09/93 Closeout  305.00  9.50 
    Overall  gain:   -13.50  ¢ 




The charts indicate, after the start of the decision period on November 1, a choppy market with no 
sustained and major price moves (Figures 11 and 12).  The price range was from 330 down to 280 and 
then came abrupt price rallies in early July that typically come in association with either a government 
report that indicates yields will be lower than had been expected or some other outside influence.  The 
9/18 generated five round-turn trades with the initial short position being established at 321.00 on 
November 2 since November 1 occurred on Sunday.  The 9/18 closed that trade at with no gain before 
commissions and was  able to generate only modest gains through the year.   
 
The 10/61, in 1993, was less effective, lifting the short hedge established on November 2 at a small loss 
and then incurring another loss after the sell signal that was confirmed on December 22 (Figure 12).  The 
buy-back occurred in the middle of January at a loss of 17.75 cents.  The chart indicates a market that is 
moving but in choppy-type behavior as compared to a sustained move.  The 10/61 lost 16.5 cents after 
commissions.  With a harvest-period price near $3.05 for the July futures prices, this performance is not 
impressive since it would drop the futures price equivalent down toward $2.885 ($3.05 - 0.165).      20
 
 






















Figure 12.  July 1993 KC Wheat, 10/61 Moving Averages 






















Figure 11.  July 1993 KC Wheat, 9/18 Moving Averages   21
Table 8.  Transaction Dates, Prices, and Net for Each Round Turn Trade in a 









9/18 System with No Penetration Rule 
11/01/93 Short  307.00   
11/02/93 Buy  (B)  310.25  -3.25 
01/21/94 Sell  (S)  337.00   
02/09/94 B  347.25  -10.25 
02/24/94 S  339.50   
03/31/94 B  323.75  15.75 
04/15/94 S  316.00   
05/03/94 B  331.00  -15.00 
05/18/94 S  327.25   
05/25/94 B  331.50  -4.25 
06/24/94 S  327.75   
07/11/94 Closeout  330.25  -2.50 
    Overall  gain:   -19.50  ¢ 
    Gain  less  commissions:  -25.50  ¢ 
10/61 and 2-Cent Penetration System 
03/03/94 S  331.00   
05/25/94 B  331.50  -0.50 
    Overall  gain:   -0.50  ¢ 




The charts suggest (Figures 13 and 14) 1994 was a potentially difficult year with a major move up in 
price during the last few months of 1993 and then a choppy, volatile segment in the March, April, and 
May period near harvest.  The 9/18 generated only one positive round-turn trade during this entire time 
period.  That gain was associated with the February 24 to March 31 trade.  The short position attributed to 
the system since the 9-day was below the 18-day on November 1, started the streak of relatively small 
losses from which it was difficult to recover.  Overall gains were -25.5 cents for the 9/18 after 
commissions. 
 
The 10/61 would have kept the producer off short hedges from the November 1 start date (the system was 
long on November 1 with the 10 above the 61) until early March.  The system basically ignored the 
choppy action December through February at prices as high as 350 to 355, generated a confirmed sell 
signal on March 3, and then bought those short hedges back on a confirmed buy signal on May 25.  The 
early July dip by the 10-day down through the 61-day did not match the 2-cent penetration rule, so no 
additional short hedges were placed.  This system basically left the producer in a position of early July 
futures prices that ranged from 325 up to 330-340, with only a nominal 1.50 cent loss after commissions.  
Overall, the minimal loss was an effective final result since the 325-345 July futures during harvest in 
early July would have been a decent price for the producer.     22
 
 
















Figure 14.  July 1994 KC Wheat, 10/61 Moving Averages 
















Figure 13.  July 1994 KC Wheat, 9/18 Moving Averages   23
Table 9.  Transaction Dates, Prices, and Net for Each Round Turn Trade in a Short-
Only Selective Hedging Program for Kansas City July Wheat, 1995 




9/18 System with No Penetration Rule 
11/01/94 Short  351.75   
12/02/94 Buy  (B)  350.50  1.25 
01/11/95 Sell  (S)  346.00   
02/13/95 B  343.25  2.75 
02/27/95 S  341.00   
03/20/95 B  347.00  -6.00 
    Overall  gain:   -2.00  ¢ 
    Gain  less  commissions:  -5.00  ¢ 
10/61 and 2-Cent Penetration System 
11/07/94 S  350.50   
03/31/95 B  344.75  5.75 
    Overall  gain:   5.75  ¢ 




It is important to study the charts (Figures 15 and 16) before reviewing the performance of the moving 
averages during 1995.  This market traded sideways for several months.  As it entered the decision period 
November 1, it continued that sideways pattern with prices in the 340-360 range and only minimal moves 
up and down into April.  Then the market started to push up, reflecting a relatively short crop during the 
year and the prospects for sharply higher corn prices.  It then moved above the $5.00 level and higher as 
the July futures reached maturity.  The producer would like to see in a year like this little, if any, 
subtraction from the obvious gains in a cash market that was well above $4.50 in most producing areas in 
late-June and early-July at harvest time.  With that interest in mind, both systems were quite effective.  
The 9/18 generated three round-turn trades and lost, after commissions, only 5.0 cents during the year.  A 
small 5.0 cent loss is admirable performance in that downside protection would have been in place had 
the supply-demand fundamentals not justified sharply higher prices and the producer, as a selective 
hedger, would have benefited from most of the increase in cash market prices.   
 
The performance of the 10/61 is even better than the 9/18.  The system only generated one round-turn 
trade during the year:  a sell signal to place short hedges on November 7.  The system then ignored all the 
choppy action until the market started to move up and bought those hedges back at a small gain at the end 
of March 1995.  The system was never short in the strong up-move that occurred from March to July and 
showed revenues after commissions of 4.75 cents.  Much more importantly, it gave the entire benefit of 
the strong up-move in prices during the year to the producer.  A producer interested in managing exposure 
to price risk to have protection when the price trend is down and to benefit when the price trend is up 
would have been pleased with either set of moving averages.  The $5.00 futures in July would generate a 
$4.75 cash price for producers using the moving averages as guides to a selective hedging strategy. Cash 
contracts or short hedges placed with the July futures in the $3.50 area  prior to June would have 
eliminated the benefits of the surge in wheat prices and brought significant margin calls if the short 
futures positions were held until harvest.   
   24
 

























Figure 16.  July 1995 KC Wheat, 10/61 Moving Averages 

























Figure 15.  July 1995 KC Wheat, 9/18 Moving Averages   25
Table 10.  Transaction Dates, Prices, and Net for Each Round Turn Trade in a 









9/18 System with No Penetration Rule 
11/06/95 Sell  (S)  438.00   
12/05/95 Buy  (B)  443.75  -5.75 
01/15/96 S  444.00   
01/30/96 B  466.00  -22.00 
03/15/96 S  466.00   
03/29/96 B  504.25  -38.25 
05/24/96 S  627.00   
06/19/96 B  589.00  38.00 
06/28/96 S  552.25   
07/10/96 Closeout  536.25  16.00 
    Overall  gain:   -12.00  ¢ 
    Gain  less  commissions:  -17.00  ¢ 
10/61 and 2-Cent Penetration System 
06/07/96 S  576.00   
07/10/96 Closeout  536.25  29.75 
    Overall  gain:   29.75  ¢ 




To an extent, 1996 was a repeat of 1995, albeit at higher price levels.  The charts (Figures 17 and 18) 
indicate strong moves up during the trading period from $3.50 up toward $7.00 in April and May.  
Record-high wheat prices occurred during the spring months of 1996.   Coming off a relatively short corn 
crop, corn futures behind the scene were recording a record high in the futures in the May to July 1996 
period and record high cash prices a bit later in the summer with cash corn prices in some deficit 
producing markets as high as $6.00 per bushel.  Wheat prices obviously went with corn and benefited 
from the huge move up that the corn market saw and the largely bullish fundamentals that prevailed for 
wheat as well.  In a year like 1996, what producers want from a moving average system is minimal or no 
losses and the opportunity to benefit from prices that were as high as $5.50, even in early to mid-July.   
 
Both systems did reasonably well given that the futures had a $3.50 range within the year. Five round-
turn trades via the 9/18 and an overall -17.00 cents after commissions would have left the producer with a 
net price near $5.00 in early July. Two relatively large losing trades occurred January through March of 
the year.  There is always a tendency in an upward moving market for moving averages to sometimes see 
a small downward correction in prices as a “top” and signal short hedges.  Calling a premature top 
happened with the 9/18 system and it was not able to recover all those losses on the much more favorable 
round-turn trade from May 24 to June 19.  The 10/61 was more effective, generating only one round-turn 
trade with a sell signal on June 7 at 576.00 and then a closeout price of 535.25 on July 10.  The 10/61 
system generated a gain of 28.75 cents after commissions to add to the $5.00 plus futures price equivalent 
at harvest during 1996.  For producers with substantial yields, it was a bonanza year.     26
 
 











Figure 17.  July 1996 KC Wheat, 9/18 Moving Averages 











Figure 18.  July 1996 KC Wheat, 10/61 Moving Averages   27
Table 11.  Transaction Dates, Prices, and Net for Each Round Turn Trade in a Short-









9/18 System with No Penetration Rule 
11/01/96 Short  355.75   
12/18/96 Buy  (B)  361.75  -6.00 
01/06/97 Sell  (S)  352.00   
01/13/97 B  367.00  -15.00 
05/05/97 S  431.50   
07/11/97 Closeout  330.75  100.75 
    Overall  gain:   79.75  ¢ 
    Gain  less  commissions:  76.75  ¢ 
10/61 and 2-Cent Penetration System 
11/01/96 Short  355.75   
01/14/97 B  364.50 -8.75 
05/28/97 S  395.25   
07/10/97 Closeout  330.75  64.50 
    Overall  gain:   55.75  ¢ 




The 1997 year was the reverse of what was seen in 1996.  Prices trended sharply lower during the year 
from the $5.00 level down toward $3.40-3.50, then rallied based on weather problems back up toward the 
$5.00 level in April.  Once again, the primary need for a selective hedging program during a year like 
1997 is to get benefits from most of the surge in price that occurred from the November-December time 
period out through April and still have protection for much of the major and sustained price break that 
occurred from April into the June-July harvest period.  The 9/18 generated three round-turn transactions 
during this period with a huge $1.00 per bushel plus gain on the last trade on May 5 to the closeout date 
on July 11 since July 10 was not a business day (Figure 19).  The after-commission gain was 76.75 cents.  
That gain, added to a 340-350 futures price equivalent during the early-July harvest period, would push 
effective wheat prices back up toward $4.15-4.25 as a futures price equivalent.   
 
The 10/61 performed well, generating one small loss from the short position established for the system on 
November 1 out toward a buy signal on January 14.  Note that the system was then considerably later 
generating a sell signal than was the 9/18 (Figure 20).  During May, the 9/18 generated a signal at 431.50 
on May 5, and the 10/61 did not get a confirmed sell signal until May 28 at 395.25.  Clearly, the big 
difference in the performance between the two systems during the year was the 9/18 gaining over $1.00 
during that major downturn and the 10/61 generating a before-commission gain of $0.645 per bushel.  
Nonetheless, the 53.75 cent after-commission gain for the 10/61 during the year would push effective 
harvest-period futures price equivalents back up toward $4.00.  Again, it was a very good year for 
producers with decent yields.   
   28
 
 
























Figure 19.  July 1997 KC Wheat, 9/18 Moving Averages 
























Figure 20.  July 1997 KC Wheat, 10/61 Moving Averages   29
Table 12.  Transaction Dates, Prices, and Net for Each Round Turn Trade in a 









9/18 System with No Penetration Rule 
11/03/97 Short  397.00   
12/09/97 Buy  (B)  380.25  16.75 
12/12/97 Sell  (S)  368.50   
01/21/98 B  358.50  10.00 
02/13/98 S  359.50   
03/06/98 B  358.00 1.50 
03/23/98 S  354.50   
05/12/98 B  322.50  32.00 
05/19/98 S  322.25   
06/24/98 B  317.75 4.50 
07/07/98 S  301.25   
07/10/98 Closeout  289.50  11.75 
    Overall  gain:   77.50  ¢ 
    Gain  less  commissions:  70.50  ¢ 
10/61 and 2-Cent Penetration System 
11/10/97 S  385.25   
03/12/98 B  366.75  18.50 
03/25/98 S  349.75   
07/10/98 Closeout  289.50  60.25 
    Overall  gain:   78.75  ¢ 




After the November 1 starting period, the market basically trended lower.  A producer would want to be 
protected against all or a substantial part of that price decline, which was from the $4.00 level in the 
fourth quarter of 1997 to below $3.00 in late harvest of 1998.  The 9/18 generated a number of round-turn 
signals during the year (Figure 21).  After commissions, gains for the 9/18 were 70.5 cents, pushing the 
$2.90-3.00 harvest-period futures equivalent well up into profitable territory at $3.60-3.70.  The 9/18 was 
able to manage the ins and outs of this market.  Upon examining the chart, the price surges or price dips 
do not look quite as dramatic as seen in earlier years; the timing of the moving average sell and buy 
signals was more effective.   
 
The 10/61 was even more effective, generating a sell signal on November 10 and not buying short hedges 
back until March 12.  A gain of 18.5 cents was generated, with a late March sell signal then occurring.  
With the July 10 closeout of 289.50 a gain of 60.25 cents was realized on that particular round-turn trade.  
The net after commissions for the 10/61 for 1998 was 76.75 cents, pushing the $2.90-3.00 futures price 
equivalent at harvest again well up into the $3.67-3.77 range, in profitable territory for most producers.   
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Figure 21.  July 1998 KC Wheat, 9/18 Moving Averages 

































Figure 22.  July 1998 KC Wheat, 10/61 Moving Averages   31
Table 13.  Transaction Dates, Prices, and Net for Each Round Turn Trade in a 
Short-Only Selective Hedging Program for Kansas City July Wheat, 1999
Date  Action  Closing Price (¢/bu)  Net Trade  
(¢/bu) 
9/18 System with No Penetration Rule 
11/06/98 Sell  (S)  344.75   
11/19/98 Buy  (B)  350.00  -5.25 
11/23/98 S  337.00   
12/31/98 B  330.50  7.50 
01/21/99 S  325.50   
03/11/99 B  316.00  9.50 
04/12/99 S  295.50   
05/18/99 B  285.50  10.00 
05/24/99 S  272.50   
06/07/99 B  287.25 -14.75 
06/23/99 S  280.25   
07/12/99 Closeout  257.25  23.00 
    Overall  gain:   30.00  ¢ 
    Gain  less  commissions:  24.00  ¢ 
10/61 and 2-Cent Penetration System 
12/07/98 S  335.75   
07/12/99 Closeout  257.25  78.50 
    Overall  gain:   78.50  ¢ 




The 1999 year looks somewhat like 1998 in that the post-November 1 price moves were largely trending 
lower.  Price surges and price dips this year looked a bit more abrupt and dramatic than they did in 1998, 
and the difference showed up in the performance of the 9/18 system (Figure 23).  Six overall round-turn 
trades were generated with an after-commission gain of 24.00 cents.  Two losses on this system occurred 
as it attempted to deal with a volatile market, one of them coming on the short hedges established on 
November 6 and the other later in 1999 on the short hedges established May 24.  What happened after 
May 24 was a sharp surge up in price.  Then, as soon as the buy signal was generated and the short hedge 
was lifted at a loss, the market turned lower again.  With a harvest-period futures price in the $2.60-2.70 
area, the 9/18 would have only improved the futures price equivalent to the $2.84-2.94 area. 
 
The 10/16 was more effective, ignoring most of the short-term gyrations in the market and generating a 
confirmed sell signal on December 7.  Those short hedges were not bought back during the entire time 
period, and the market was closed out (Figure 24) on July 12, the first business day after the closeout date 
of July 10.  After-commission gains were 77.5 cents, converting a $2.60-2.70 market to $3.37-3.47 and 
making 1998 look substantially more attractive to producers.   
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Figure 23.  July 1999 KC Wheat, 9/18 Moving Averages 


















Figure 24.  July 1999 KC Wheat, 10/61 Moving Averages   33
Table 14.  Transaction Dates, Prices, and Net for Each Round Turn Trade in a 





Closing Price  
(¢/bu) 
Net Trade  
(¢/bu) 
9/18 System with No Penetration Rule 
11/05/99 Short  314.50   
11/12/99 Buy  (B)  306.00  8.50 
11/16/99 Sell  (S)  310.50   
12/28/99 B  294.75  15.75 
02/03/00 S  303.25   
02/14/00 B  320.50 -17.25 
02/28/00 S  296.75   
03/16/00 B  306.00  -9.25 
03/27/00 S  289.50   
04/07/00 B  289.00  0.50 
04/18/00 S  289.00   
05/09/00 B  291.25  -2.25 
06/06/00 S  297.75   
06/21/00 B  310.50 -12.75 
07/07/00 S  287.00   
07/10/98 Closeout  288.50  1.50 
    Overall  gain:   -18.00  ¢ 
    Gain  less  commissions:  -25.00  ¢ 
10/61 and 2-Cent Penetration System 
11/01/99 Short  308.00   
01/19/00 B  314.00  -6.00 
03/07/00 S  298.50   
05/16/00 B  302.50  -4.00 
    Overall  gain:   -10.00  ¢ 




The 2000 market showed a pattern of short-term moves up and down with no sustained and consistent 
move in price in any direction.  Looking at the charts (Figures 25 and 26), especially during the period 
after November 1, indicates that this market is probably going to be difficult for any selective hedging 
system.  The 9/18 generated a number of sell signals and subsequent buy-backs during the year with 
several of them realizing losses and the overall after-commission net of -25.00 cents.  With July futures in 
early July in the $2.80-2.90 range, that would pull this market equivalent down to $2.55-2.65.  The year 
2000 clearly turned out to be difficult for these selective hedging systems, certainly for the 9/18.   
 
The 10/61 did not fare much better.  A short position was established in accordance with the 10 being 
more than 2 cents below the 61 on November 1, 1999.  Those short hedges were bought back at a 6-cent 
loss on January 19.  The subsequent sell signal in early March was bought back in mid-May at another 
small loss.  Overall, there was a -12.00 cents loss, less than the 9/18 loss but not impressive.   Obviously, 
2000 is a year in which moving average systems did not work well.  They will typically not work well in 
a market with choppy moves up and down and no sustained moves to lower prices or to higher prices.   
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Figure 25.  July 2000 KC Wheat, 9/18 Moving Averages 
























Figure 26.  July 2000 KC Wheat, 10/61 Moving Averages   35
Summary on Performance 
 
Table 15 shows the overall results.  On average, the 10/61 added nearly $0.29 per bushel to wheat prices 
and the 9/18 added nearly $0.17 per bushel.  The $0.29 is 9.4 percent of the average cash price of $3.10 
using a -$0.25 harvest-period basis.  The 10/61 system lost money in 1993, 1994, and 2000, with the 2000 
performance clearly the worst.   
 
In recognizing that such a “short hedge only” system will, on occasion, lose money for the year, it is 
important to remember that (1) short hedges will be in place during sustained price decreases and this 
protection has a value, and (2) the systems keep the producer off short hedges during sustained price 
rallies to allow the benefit of higher cash prices.  In the 10/61, we have a flexible system that offers 
protection, allows benefits of rising markets, and averages $0.29 per bushel in after-commission profits.   
 
Table 15.  After Commission Net Profits by Year, for July Kansas City Wheat, and Overall 
Average Net Profits for the 9/18 and 10/61 Systems 








KC July Wheat 






  (¢ per bushel)  ($ per bushel) 
1990 36.50  19.50  303.75  2.79  3.16  2.99 
1991 -4.25  29.50  266.00  2.41  2.37  2.71 
1992 33.75  27.25  332.00  3.07  3.41  3.34 
1993 4.25  -16.50  (7/12)  300.00  2.75  2.79  2.59 
1994 -25.50  -1.50  (7/12)  330.25  3.05  2.80 3.04 
1995 -5.00  4.75  446.00  4.21  4.16  4.25 
1996 -17.00  28.75  536.25  5.11  4.94 5.40 
1997 76.75  53.75  330.75  3.06  3.83  3.60 
1998 70.50  76.75  289.50  2.65  3.36  3.42 
1999 24.00  77.50  257.25  2.32  2.56  3.10 
2000 -25.00  -12.00  288.50  2.64  2.39 2.52 
Average 16.90 28.78  334.57  3.10  3.25  3.36 
 
Figure 27 shows yearly effective prices for the 9/18 and 10/61 with a cash price series that reflects a 
-$0.25 basis.  Figure 27 is a graphical picture of the 3 columns on the right side of Table 15.   
 
Figure 28 shows important cash flow information.  It is possible that a risk management program generate 
profits for the decade, but the farm firm might still go broke with negative cash flows during the period.  
The cumulative after commission additions to profits for the 9/18 and 10/61 are always above the zero 
line.  The cumulative additions to profits are nearly $3.00 per bushel for the 10/61 system in the last two 
years, and this positive contribution to the cash flow would have reduced the need to borrow money to 
produce the wheat crops and significantly increase the profitability of hard red winter wheat producers 









































Figure 28.  Cumulative Revenue Above Cash Price for 9/18 and 10/61 Systems, 1990-2000   37
Review of Performance in Years with Strong Positive Price 
Trends 
 
Consistent with the stated objective of moving average systems, the selective hedger will want to benefit 
from higher prices during years in which the price trend is up.  One of the sub objectives of being a 
selective hedger is to avoid the opportunity costs and the margin calls associated with holding short 
hedges or cash forward contracts during upward trending markets.  The preference would be for a moving 
average system that, if it cannot show positive results during the year, would show a result close to zero 
and, therefore, leave most of the benefit of higher prices to the producer.  During the 1990s, there were 
two years in which the price trend was generally higher during much of the year.  The first year was 1995, 
when July Kansas City prices, which were in the neighborhood of $3.50 in November and December, 
exploded to the upside and reached the $5.00 level in July.  Examination of Table 9 indicates that both of 
the moving average systems were quite effective in this particular year.  The round turns recorded by the 
9/18 combination showed a minimal loss of 5.0 cents per bushel after commissions, and the 10/61 system 
was even better.  It showed a nominal gain of 4.75 cents.  Both systems clearly allowed the producer to 
benefit from cash prices well above $4.00 with a -$0.25 harvest-period basis level.  The minimal loss of 
the 9/18 can be viewed as the opportunity cost of not being a cash market speculator during the year, but 
the selective hedger was in a far different position from the producer acting as a cash speculator.  There 
was protection in place when the markets turned down periodically during the year for the selective 
hedger, but the cash market speculator was totally exposed if the year had turned out differently and 
prices had moved sharply lower.  The ideal for a selective hedging program during such an up year in 
price is small losses at the worst, small or significant gains at the best.  The 9/18 showed the small losses 
and the 10/61 was even better in showing small gains after commissions.  
 
The second year, 1996, looks a bit different.  Prices that were in the $4.30-4.50 range in November and 
December of 1995 spiraled up toward the $6.50-7.00 level in April and May, and then backed off to the 
$5.00-5.50 range in July.  The cash price equivalent with a negative 25-cent basis on July 10 with the 
$5.36 closing price on that date $5.11.  The 9/18 lost 17.0 cents after commissions and reduced the 
effective harvest-period net cash price to $4.94.  The 10/61 was much better in this particular year, adding 
nearly 29 cents to the cash price equivalent of $5.11 and pushing the effective cash price up to $5.40 
given the price levels of July 10.  This exceptional performance occurred in a year in which the market 
showed a strong move up and then a fairly substantial decline during the last two months of the year.  The 
10/61, by avoiding any false signals in changes in direction of price movement, was very effective in 
1996.   
 
 
Review of Performance in Years with Consistently Lower 
Price Move  
 
During years of falling prices, the objective of the selective hedger is to have protection against most of 
the price decline.  As guides to selective hedging programs, performance of the moving average systems 
must be examined with a very critical eye during years of falling prices.  For three years during the 1990-
2000 period, the predominant move was downward from late in the prior calendar year into harvest.  In 
1990, the July futures were in the $3.40-3.60 range in October and November of 1989 and moved to 
below the $2.90 level in July of 1990.  The selective hedger will want the moving average system to 
generate protection against much or all of the price decline that reached 80 to 90 cents in magnitude by 
the end of the year.  The 9/18 system generated after-commission gains of 36.5 cents and was, in 1990, 
significantly better than the 10/61, which generated after-commission gains of 19.5 cents.  The effective 
net prices were near $3.16 and $2.99 respectively for the 9/18 and 10/61 systems, with both prices being   38
significantly better than the $2.79 cash price consistent with the $3.04 closing price of the July wheat 
futures on July 10, 1990.  Performance was positive but not exceptional in that something less than full 
coverage was afforded by the two systems.  
 
The next year in which the price trend was predominantly lower all year was 1998.  With futures as high 
as $4.00 and higher in the fourth quarter of 1997, this market moved lower and was well below $3.00 
during the early July harvest period.  From the highs during the year, this move down was in excess of 
$1.00 per bushel.  Both systems performed well in that the 9/18 generated after-commission nets of 70.50 
cents and the 10/61 was even better at 76.75 cents.  This performance, of course, is what the selective 
hedger wants to see in that the majority of the price declines suffered during the year in the cash market 
was covered in the short hedging program in futures.  In Table 12, the cash price equivalent of $2.65 on 
July 10 ($3.00 futures less $.25 basis) was effectively raised to $3.36 by the 9/18 system and to $3.42 by 
the 10/61 system.  Performance was exceptional by both moving average systems during a year in which 
the prices moved down from quite profitable levels to break-even or loss levels at harvest.   
 
The 1999 season showed significant price moves down to some of the lowest levels seen in a decade.  The 
market was in the $3.50-3.60 price range in the fourth quarter of 1998 and slid below the $2.60 level in 
early July 1999.  Once again, the need for the selective hedger is to have protection against the majority 
of what was roughly a 90-cent per bushel decline in price.  In 1999, both systems contributed, but the 
contributions were significantly different.  The 9/18 was caught up in some in-and-out trades and some 
small losing trades during the year as the market turned volatile.  The system contributed an after-
commission net of 24.00 cents a bushel.  The 10/61 avoided the in-and-out trades and performed much 
better, adding 77.50 cents to the cash price equivalent at harvest of $2.32 ($2.57 July 10 close less $0.25 
basis).  The 10/16 system would, therefore, move the effective cash price up to about $3.10 and put it 
back at price levels that would be profitable for most producers.  Contributing after commission gains of 
77 cents in a year in which the price range after the 1998 harvest was only about $1.00 is indeed 
impressive performance, and I would not expect to see this reproduced each year in which prices trend 
lower.   
 
The Most Difficult Year for the Selective Hedging Systems 
 
In both up and down markets, the moving average systems can clearly perform well during years in 
which sustained moves in price occur.  If the trend is higher during much of the year, and those higher 
prices come in a rather orderly and well behaved bull market without short-term gyrations, both systems 
are capable of ensuring that the producer gets the benefit of the rising cash market.  Producers tend to stay 
off the short hedges and avoid both the opportunity costs that otherwise would be suffered as prices move 
higher in the presence of short hedge positions and, at the same time, they avoid the significant margin 
calls that otherwise would be present.  Clearly,  that when the market moves down in a sustained fashion, 
the moving average systems can cover the majority of losses that would be incurred if the producer were 
acting as a cash market speculator.  Examination of the July contracts in 1990, 1998, and 1999 indicated 
that performance will be much better when the downward price movement comes in a sustained fashion 
as compared to a choppy, volatile price pattern.   
 
The single year in which the performance was poorest for the selective hedging systems was clearly the 
2000 Kansas City July wheat futures.  Studying the charts in Figures 25 and 26, one can easily see why 
the poor performance might have been the case.  From fourth quarter price levels in 1999 in the 305 to 
315 area, the market chopped sideways in a volatile fashion all year, reaching a price level of around 325 
in February, dipping to the 280-285 level in March and April, and then moving down toward 275 in the 
early July period.  Also of note is that the market was in a 50-cent trading range from late 1999 through 
harvest, having none of the characteristics of sustained moves in any one direction that tended to occur in   39
most years of the 1990s.  The 9/18 generated a number of round turn trades that imposed small losses on 
the producer, and the 10/61, while not trading frequently, was not much more effective.  The after-
commission net for the November 1 through July 10 analysis period from the 9/18 was -25.00 cents and 
the after-commission net from the 10/61 was -12.00 cents.  These after commission results converts the 
relatively poor cash price of $2.63 ($2.88 less $0.25 basis) on July 10, 2000 to $2.38 and $2.51 for the 
9/18 and 10/61 systems, respectively.  Clearly, losses can be associated with moving average systems in 
choppy, sideways markets.  Such losses in years with choppy price action are the insurance premiums, 
perhaps, that producers have to pay to be sure that they will have protection during years in which the 
price moves down in a sustained fashion and to also be in a position to benefit from rising cash markets in 
years in which the markets move up in a sustained fashion.   
 
Testing Out of Sample  
 
There is no guarantee that a system that is profitable in the 1990-2000 period will be effective outside the 
data period from which the optimal system is derived.  A common practice to indicate whether the system 
is likely to work in other years is to conduct “out-of-sample” tests. 
 
The 10/61 system of moving averages is shown on the July 2001 Kansas City wheat chart in Figure 29.  
Not all data used in calculating the 61-day moving average are shown on the chart, but the first confirmed 
short hedge (2-cent penetration requirement was met) occurred on December 15 at a closing price of 
330.50.  This and later round-turn trades are shown in Table 16. 
 









12/15/2000 Sell  330.50   
01/06/2001 Buy  349.00 -18.50 
02/06/2001 S  333.75   
04/27/2001 B  334.25 -1.00 
05/29/2001 S  319.25   
07/10/2001 Closeout  298.00  21.25 
Overall gain:          1.75 ¢ 
Gain less commission:    -1.25 ¢ 
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The net after commissions was -1.25 cents, indicating that 2001 was a year in which the 10/61 did not 
work very well.  The market was choppy with no sustained moves down until the late May to July 
decline.  The May 29 sell signal did protect against a prolonged price dip, but there was no added revenue 
to make the net cash price better than a cash market speculative position would have been in 2001.   
 
The July 2002 contract is shown in Figure 30.  The 10/61 was in a “sell mode” from the earliest possible 
calculation of the 61-day moving averages.  Following the rules used in analysis of the 1990-2000 period, 
short hedges were established on November 1 at the closing price of 314.25.  Those positions would have 
been lifted by a confirmed buy signal on June 7 at 298.00.  (Neither the late-January nor the mid-April 
price surge pushed the 10-day moving average as much as 2 cents above the 61-day moving average.)  
The after-commission gain would be 15.25 cents.  With a July 10 closing price of 348.00 and using the -
$0.25 per bushel basis, the cash price equivalent on July 10 would be $3.23 and the $0.15 gain from the 
moving averages would boost the effective cash price to $3.38.   
 
The life-of-contract high on this chart was $3.84 on January 25 of 2001 when little or no trade activity 
occurred.  The effective price of $3.38 is only $0.21 below the best forward pricing opportunity ever 
offered ($3.84 top price minus $0.25 basis) during the life of the contract.  Technically, producers could 
have used the 10/61 to establish short hedges earlier than November 1 and at higher prices (see Figure 
30), but the November 1 rule was used in the interests of consistency. The July futures prices up toward 
$3.50 and the 15.25 after commission gains from the moving average system combine to make this a very 
















JULY 2001 KANSAS CITY WHEAT
 
 
Figure 29.  The Optimal 10/61 System on the July 2001 KC Wheat   41
 
The 10/61 system was actually effective for the 2002 crop in two important ways.  First, using the 10/61, 
producers would have been short almost all year with short hedge protection in place and with no trading 
on and off the short hedges.  The system then required producers to lift the short hedges in early June to 
allow the second benefit, bring in position to take advantage of the 70-cent rally from the $2.80 lows of 
early June up to the $3.50 area in early July .  The flexibility of moving average systems in guiding a 
selective hedging program is evident on this 2002 contract.   
 
No details are provided, but the 10/61 system with the 2-cent penetration requirement was also tested 
across the 1980-89 period.  During those 10 years, the profit maximizing system was the 12-day and 13-
day moving averages with a 0.5 cent penetration requirement.  Average yearly profits were 18.48 cents.  
The system traded 41 times across the 10 years, or about 4 times per year on average.   
 
The 10/61 with the 2-cent penetration requirement averaged 11.55 cents yearly with 15 trades across the 
1980-89 period.  In terms of percentiles, the 10/61 was at the 86
th percentile for the 1980s, which means 
only 14 percent of all possible moving average and penetration requirement combinations analyzed were 
better.  This effective performance outside the 1990-2000 data period suggests the 10/61 system is in fact 
effective outside the period in which it was generated, but performance in any future year is never 
guaranteed.   If and when the hard red winter wheat market changes significantly in terms of frequency 
and/or amplitude of price moves relative to the 1990s, some system other than the 10/61 with the 2-cent 














JULY 2002 KANSAS CITY WHEAT 
 
 
Figure 30.  The Optimal 10/61 System on the July 2002 KC Wheat  
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The objective of the selective hedger is to have protection against major price declines and be off short 
hedges so as to benefit when prices move up.  A proficient and disciplined chart reader may be able to 
meet these objectives, but not everyone is “proficient” any many potential hedgers are not “disciplined.”  
The moving average systems provide an objective alternative.   
 
Across the 1990-2000 period, the optimal 10-day and 61-day moving average system with a 2-cent 
penetration rule averaged nearly $.29 per bushel per year in after-commission profits.  Price risk exposure 
could have been managed by the user of the system in such a way that ruinous losses were avoided and 
producers would been in position to benefit from sustained price increases.  As a guide to risk 
management and as a safety net to protect the financial position of the farm firm, the optimal system has 
something to offer that will be in addition to any price supports and/or subsidies offered by the latest 
Farm Bill.  Hard red winter wheat producers are encouraged to take a look. 
 
Kansas City July wheat futures are now traded longer than they were in the early 1990s.  As a last 
suggestion, I would start monitoring the 10/61 system with the 2-cent penetration rule around July 1 of 
the prior year with the intent of placing short hedges the first time a sell signal is generated after July 1.  
Usually, there is some type of post-harvest price rally that will then, sometime later, show prices starting 
to decline and generate a sell signal.  The “rule” of taking the November 1 close to start the short hedge 
positions in this analysis was necessary because the early 1990s contracts did not start trading early 
enough to calculate a 61-day moving average prior to November 1.  There should be no such restrictions 
in the future.  
 